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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has agreed to retain this appeal. Jurisdiction is 
established by Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4-103. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 7. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 12. 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
4. Utah R. Civ. P. 60 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This case was filed, with multiple claims by both parties against each other, in the 
year 2006. R. at 1. 
2. After years of useless motions, changes in counsel and many delays, the case was 
finally given to the lower court on a partial summary judgment motion, which the court 
granted in favor of Appellees. A. at 5,601. 
3. Said judgment left some of the issues unresolved. However, Appellees moved for a 
second summary judgment, which the lower court also granted. It eliminated all the 
remaining issues of fact and law. R. at 6,026. 
4. After said judgment was issued~ Appellants made many post-judgment motions, 
attempting to have the same set aside or vacated. See record generally. 
5. However, the lower court denied all the said extant motions and affirmed the two 
summary judgments it had formerly made. R. at 6,435. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
At the outset, Appellees wish to emphasize one fact: in the Appellants' brief, they 
chose to completely ignore one very important order that the trial court handed down. 
Shortly after the judgment from which the Appellants appeal was entered, the original 
judge retired. After a new judge was brought on the case, Appellants spent several 
months filing motions to reconsider and to set aside the retired judge's order, making 
the exact same arguments they have made in their initial appeal. Indeed, the record 
shows that they filed at least 9 post-judgment motions, all of which Appellees had to 
counter, and most of which, in Appellees' opinion, were not allowed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Finally, after all the motions were submitted to the lower court, one 
more succinct memorandum decision came from the new judge on the case. In it, the 
judge put to rest the very issues Appellants raise in the instant case. Appellees ask this 
Court to study that decision carefully when deciding this case so that the Court may see 
that these issues have already been dealt with. The decision is located at page 6,435 in 
the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case dragged on for over 8 years in the lower court. Something had to be 
done to finish it. Appellees offer the following arguments in support of their Summary 
Judgments which Appellants assail. 
First, Appellants had approximately 3 months to oppose the summary judgment 
motion in question. During that time, Appellees did not even submit it to the Court and, 
still, Appellants did not answer. Further, the when the Court finally did sign the 
judgment, it was well supported by the facts and law. 
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Next, considering the protracted litigation preceding this appeal, the attorney fee 
award given by the lower court is more than justified by statute. 
Lastly, the subject trust, which Appellees have continually shown to be valid, 
gave Appellees broad authority. Hence, the actions of the Appellees, which Appellants 
deem to be breaches of fiduciary duty, were rightly and universally determined by the 
lower court to be appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
This case is simply one of mishandled procedural maneuvers and untimely 
assertions of claims. Appellants simply did not follow the rules and, when given the 
opportunity, were unable to show any evidence of their claims against Appellees. 
I. APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE ANY OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AT ISSUE FOR MANY MONTHS AND, THEREFORE, LOST THEIR RIGHT TO 
OPPOSE IT. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is very clear about an opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment. It states that " ... (e)ach material fact set forth in the motion ... that is 
not disputed is deemed admitted ... " See U.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(4). 
Appellants cite this Court's decision in Pepperwood Homeowners Assn. v. 
Mitchell as precedent for authority to undo a lower court's summary judgment. See Brief 
of the Appellant, Page 22, Paragraph 1. However, the instant case is vastly different 
from Pepperwood. In Pepperwood, a claimant sued a party for failure to pay H.O.A. 
assessments. See Pepperwood, 351 P.3d 844 (Utah App. 2015) After bringing suit 
against the party, the claimant moved for summary judgment, supporting the same with 
everything but the very document that would prove that the other party was obligated to 
pay the assessments. Id. Nevertheless, the other party faiJed to oppose the summary 
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judgment motion in time and the extant lower court granted it Id. On appeal, this Court 
reversed the summary judgment granted by the lower court because the extant 
judgment was not supported by " ... evidence of an instrument obligating (the party) to 
pay the assessments ... ", which instrument was the foundational document upon which 
the original extant suit was brought. Id. at 848. The Pepperwood Court further stated 
that " ... (i)t should ... have been obvious to the district court that, by faiHng to produce the 
instrument that formed the basis of its claim, (the claimant) failed to demonstrate its 
entitlement to a judgment..." Id. 
The instant case is the exact opposite of Pepperwood. As the facts above show, 
Appellees came at this matter in what was ultimately a defensive posture: Appellants 
sued them for breach of their fiduciary duties and they denied those accusations. Thus, 
when Appellees presented their motion for summary judgment, it was to essentially 
dismiss Appellants' claims of breach against them. They presented affidavits and 
documents showing support for the same and the lower court, after careful 
consideration and following over 8 years of titigation, granted the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Pepperwood involved the glaring omission of a fundamentat document at the 
beginning of a short case. This case, howeverJ involves a judgment supported by all the 
requisite evidence, following almost a decade of litigation where the facts had been 
brought before the lower court many times. In sum: the lower court knew what it was 
doing. 
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Absent the authority of Pepperwood, which Appellees have shown above does 
not relate to this case 1 the Court is left with Rufe 56,- which affirms that " ... 
(e)ach .. .fact...that is not disputed is deemed admitted ... " U.R.Civ.P. 56(a)(4). 
A. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED APPELLANTS TO 
MAKE AN UNTIMELY OPPOSmON TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
THE SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT FLOWING FROM rr WAS STILL JUSTIFIED ON 
THE MERITS. 
Assuming that Pepperwood applies, which it does not, Appellants themselves 
state the rule that, even in cases of no response to a summary judgment motion, the 
court " ... must still determine whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery, and 
affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ... " See 
Pepperwood, cited above. Appellees have done just that in this case. In fact, the lower 
court questioned the factual and legal basis of the Appellees motion before it granted 
the Summary Judgment which is at issue here. See R. at 6,457-6.463 If the Court 
carefully reads the exchange between the original trial judge and Appellees' counsel, it 
will see that such a basis was established before the lower court ruled. Id. 
Specifically, the court looked at the ruling of a board of arbitration which cleared 
the Trustees of any breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Further, the trust itself dictates that 
boards of arbitration are the correct method in settling disputes just such as this case. 
R. 6522, paragraph 2 and R. 6526, paragraphs 19 and 20. 
Further, regarding the merits of the case and whether or not they were 
considered as a basis for the judgment in question, the second judge at the trial level 
stated in his memorandum opinion that, 
... even if there were a mistake of law in (the lower court's) ruling on the 
(motion for summary judgment), the instant motion (to set aside) is not 
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welt taken. ·'[A]n appeal or a motion for a new trial~ ratherthan a rule 60(b) 
motion, is the proper avenue to address alleged mistakes of law 
committed by the district court ... Mistakes of law are excluded from the 
narrow realm of 'mistakes' recognized under rule 60 ... typically 'minor 
oversights, ... which in most cases would be obvious." R. at 6436, 
paragraph 2nd full paragraph. 
In other words, if Appellants had such a problem with the factual findings made by the 
lower court, they should have used different procedural means to gain the relief they 
sought: Appellants simply filed the wrong documents at the wrong time. 
Appellants also state that Appellees' assertion that Appellee Penn Smith's 
compensation rate was reasonable was supported by inadmissible hearsay. However, 
even if that were the case, the lower court has the discretion, on its own, to determine 
that $50 an hour for a trust manager's services is appropriate, which it did. Appellants 
se.ek to impose the requirement on Appelfees that Mr. Smith should have to show that 
he was promised payment by the Trust. As Mr. Smith's affidavit showed, he performed 
services, the trust entitles him to compensation, and he had kept track of his time and 
hours. See A. at 5421 - 5422 and R. at 5432. 
Also to the facts themselves, the lower court also directly addressed the 
opposing decisions of the two respective boards of arbitration, cited by Appellants in 
their brief. In disposing of Appellants' present argument, the lower court stated, 
... the (c)ourt is not convinced that the (Appellees) engaged in the 'gross 
misrepresentation' of the 2007 Board's findings that the (Appellants) claim 
entitles them to relief under Rule 60 ... This has been a contentious case 
and the (c)ourt understands that the parties naturally characterize certain 
matters very differently. There simply has not been, however, a 
demonstration of the kind of fraud or misrepresentation that results in the 
'prevention of an opposing party from fairly presenting his case' ... Id. 
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B. AFTER THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED, THE COURT ISSUED A 
FINAL MEMORANDUM DECISION AFFIRMING ITS FORMER SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS AND DISPOSING OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THEY 
WERE NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 
Beyond the portion of the lower court's decision quoted above, the second lower 
court judge directly addressed Appellants' main argument: that they were not given the 
opportunity to oppose the summary judgment motion in question. In addressing this 
claim, the lower court stated: 
... (Appellants') belief is misbegotten. The docket indicates that they had 
over three months to oppose the {motion) but did not because they 
erroneously expected their Motion to Strike to suspend the normal 
deadlines contained in Rules 7 and 56. It is true that Rule 12(f) states, 
... Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these 
rules, upon motion made by a party within 21 days after the 
service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from 
any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous mattec .. 
A motion to strike may indeed, as (Appellants) contend, be made 'before 
responding to a pleading.' A motion for summary judgment, however, is a 
motion- not a pleading ... Importantly for present purposes, then, ... ( n)either 
Rule 12(f) nor any other rule of procedure known to the (c)ourt justifies 
(Appellants') position that they could await a ruling on the motion to strike 
before responding to a motion for summary judgment. {Appellees') 
(motion for summary judgment) was therefore not timely opposed at the 
time of the November 26, 2013 pretrial conference, and (the first lower 
court judge's) ruling certainly was not rendered without allowing 
(Appellants) in this lengthy case 'an opportunity· to oppose summary 
judgment..." R. at 6438 
Appellants cite the rule regarding Motions to Strike and argue that the same freed them 
from having to respond to Appellees' motion until the Motion to Strike was dealt with. 
However, beyond the rule they cite not allowing for any such stay in the proceedings 
(see U.R.Civ.P. 12(f) ), if the Court were to accept their argument, all any party would 
9 
have to do to delay a court's ruling on any motion is to file a Motion to Strike. Such a 
tactic would surely be against the public policy for efficient administration of justice. 
C. THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE APPELLEES FROM 
MAKING A SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellants also argue that "the law of the case'J doctrine should have prevented 
the subject second motion for summary judgment from ever having been made. See 
"Brief of the Appeflant" 7 page 30. However, as AppeHees argued in their original 
defense against this argument, Appellants completely miss the true definition of the law 
of the case doctrine. In the very case Appellants cite, IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K 
MANAGEMENT, INC., the Utah Supreme Court defined the doctrine thusfy, ~ ... (s)imply 
stated ... a decision made on an issue during one stage of the case is bjnding in 
successive stages of the same litigation ... " See IHC, 196 P.3d at 596 (Utah 2008), cited 
by Appellants in their Brief, page 30. 
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude the Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment because said motion concerned wholly unresolved and undecided issues. 
The law of the case doctrine only applies to final decisions made by the lower court. 
The Court's attention is directed to the citation made in Appellants' brief regarding 
the same IHCcase_ Id. at 30, last paragraph. In said citation, the Utah Supreme Court 
further stated that the law of the case doctrine is meant to " ... (further) the goals of 
judicial economy and finality ... " Id. 
The question should be asked: which is more judicially economical, Summary 
Judgment or Trial? Which takes less time? Which requires less expense? Appellees 
submit that, in light of the fact that this case has gone on for almost a decade, the 
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interests of judicial economy would lean sharply toward finishing the entire matter in a 
summary judgment. All that was required of the Appellants at the lower court level was 
to show some evidence of the Appellees' alleged breach of fiduciary duty and some 
evidence of the alleged unreasonableness of Mr. Smith's wage claims and, if they would 
have ever done so, they would have received their trial. For the entirety of the eight 
plus years this case spent at the lower court, they gave the court neither. If nothing 
else, the subject second Summary Judgment Motion was an effort to get Appellants to 
show what they had. They were given ample opportunity to do so and they failed. 
Additionally, the afore-cited IHC case had to do with a court's refusal to reopen a 
forfeiture issue. Id. The issue had been previously decided and closed. Id. Specifically, 
the court in IHC was reviewing the finality of a Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, not a 
Summary Judgment. Id. The opposing party wanted to reopen the Judgment and the 
Court stated that the law of the case doctrine prevented them from doing so because 
their raising of the issue was untimely. Id. 
Conversely, in this matter, the issues of breach of Appellees1 fiduciary duty and 
wage claim reasonableness had not been closed by any previous lower court ruling. On 
the contrary, the lower court had left them open and had deemed them still in dispute. 
See lower court's first "Partial Summary Judgment" R. at 5,601. 
Note the /HC court1s statement here: " ... because the district court previously 
decided the issue of forteiture, the law of the case doctrine gave the district court 
discretion to refuse to reopen the issue ... " Id. at 596. Now apply that quote to this case: 
the Summary Judgment Motion in question does not concern an issue which had been 
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previously decided by the lower court, but one which was stilt. pending when the lower 
court subsequently resolved it. 
II. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD FROM THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER AND 
LAWFUL. 
Appellants cite Utah Code, Section 788-5-825 in support of their argument that 
the lower court did not have a proper basis upon which to award attorney fees in this 
case. See "Brief of the Appellant", page 41. Specifically, Appellants say that, because 
the lower court did not make a specific finding regarding bad faith or meritless 
arguments on the part of Appellants that the resulting attorney fee award was improper. 
However, courts are given wide latitude in awarding attorney fees by the simple 
language of the very statute cited by Appellants. The code states that " ... the court shall 
award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith ... " See U.C.A., Section 788-5-825(1). 
The statue itself gives no requirement that specific findings of fact regarding bad 
faith or meritless claims issue from the court. 
However. in Appellees' second motion for summary judgment. they alleged the 
following: 
... To date, large swaths of the corpus of the Trust have been depleted and blown 
away in the hurricane of frivolous litigation that has been perpetuated by the 
(Appellants). Literally hundreds of thousands of dollars have been lost to attorneys 
fighting over meaningless causes of action ... This case should have been over in 2007 
after the ... board of arbitration found that the Trustees had been acting properly. 
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However, (Appellants) chose to continue their useless fight against the intent of their 
father, (the Trustor) ... R. at 5,616. 
In response to Appellees' assertion of frivolity and meritless claims on the part of 
Appellants, the rower court then ruled as follows: " ... the attorney fees.~-which have been 
taken out of the ... trust corpus, later to be accounted for and totaled by this (c)ourt, are to 
be paid back to the Trust by the (Appellants). Said amount shall be paid out of the 
personal assets of the (Appellants) ... " R. at 6,027. 
While the lower court may not have made specific findings regarding the 
allegations of bad faith and meritless claims Appellees leveled in their second motion for 
summary judgment, its ruling regarding attorney fees was in direct response to the 
same and should undoubtedly be considered as a direct affirmation of the allegations. 
Since the statute does not require specific findings and the record of the lower court 
shows that bad faith and frivolous claims were contemplated prior to its attorney fee 
award, the judgment giving attorney fees to Appellees from Appellants should stand. 
Ill.APPELLANTS' FIRST, NINTH, AND ELEVENTH CLAIMS WERE, IN FACT, 
RESOLVED BY THE LOWER COURT'S ORDERS. 
Appellants assert that their claims against Appellees for declaratory judgment, 
conversion and waste were not ever addressed by the lower court. However, as the 
lower court judgment states that " ... (Appellees) ... are declared to be not in breach of any 
fiduciary duty they ... have owed to the (Trust) ... " R. at 6026. 
In that one simple sentence, the judge disposed of the aforementioned claims. 
While it may not have specifically addressed each onet let it be remembered that 
Appellants' original complaint had many causes of action, most of which were redundant 
and repetitive. To asks the court to address each one by name is wasteful. 
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IV .. THE SUBJECT llJUST ALLOWS APPELLEES, WHO WERE rrs TRUSTEES, TO 
CHANGE THE TRUST SO THAT THE ORIGINAL TRUSTOR'S INTENT CAN BE 
ACCOMPLISHED. THEREFORE, THE LOWER COURTS SUBSEQUENT 
VALIDATION OF THAT TRUST, DESPITE THE IMPOSSIBILllY OF CERTAIN 
CONDITIONS OF IT BEING FULFILLED, WAS p·ROPER. 
Appellants also assert that the original Trust because the lease and stewardship 
agreements contemplated by it were never executed, should be invalidated. However, 
the Court is directed to the Trust itself, which gave the Appel.lees broad powers in trust 
reformation and amendment It states, " ... it is the intent of the TRUSTOH that upon the 
death of any of the (Appellants) the STEWARDSHIP shall revert to the (Appellees) to be 
hetd in trust for the minor male children ... " R. at 6524, paragraph 6. It also states that 
" ... no (Appellant) ... shall be empowered to control the (Appelfees} in any way or dictate 
management policies to the TRUST, or determine the disbursement of TRUST 
increase ... " R. at 6526, paragraph 22. It further states that " ... if any (Appellant) ... dies 
without a named heir his STEWARDSHIP shall revert to the ... (AppeHees), who shall 
thereupon name a replacement Beneficiary ... and issue to him ... a STEWARDSHIP ... " Id. 
at paragraph 25. Appellees were also given broad powers when the Trustor stated that 
" ... (Appellees) shall have all powers necessary to carry out and perform the duties. 
mandated to, and incumbent upon, them as TRUSTEES of this TRUST. .. " R. at 6,527 
paragraph 29. 
While the exact details of the trust may not have been accomplished, Appellees 
continually upheld the Trustor's intent and any hinderance of that intent has only been 
perpetuated by Appellants refusal to aHow Appellees to be in charge of the trust corpus, 
as dictated by Appellants' father, the Trustor. 
CONCLUSION 
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@ 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellees request that the judgments of the 
lower court in this case be affirmed. 
Dated this / B'½J,-day of January, 2016. 
CHAMBERLAIN LAW 
!We-~· 
Nicholas I. Chamberlain 
Attorney for Appellees 
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